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ARTICLE

THE

UN "SURROGATE STATE" AND THE FOUNDATION OF
REFUGEE POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Michael Kagan*

ABSTRACT
Many challenges surrounding refugee protection relate to a de
facto shift of responsibilityfrom sovereign governments to the UN Refugee
Agency (UNHCR) to directly administerrefugee policy. This phenomenon is
legally anomalous, and it is UNHCR policy to avoid the operation of such
"parallelstructures." Yet the existence of a UN "surrogatestate" offers
important advantages to some host governments, which makes state-toUNHCR responsibilityshift difficult to reverse. Using the Arab Middle East
as a case study, this article argues that, while not ideal, UNHCR's state
substitution role offers important symbolic and material benefits to
governments that host refugees and should not always be treated as an
anomaly. Addressing challenges inherent in state-to-UN responsibility shift
will be a key task if any government in the wake of the Arab Spring seeks to
improve its system of refugee reception and protection. Responsibility shift
can sometimes offer a more viable political foundation for refugee
protection than conventional notions of state responsibility.

* Associate Professor, University of Nevada Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of
Law; B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Michigan. An earlier version of this
paper was published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Policy Development and Evaluation Service under a different title ("We live in a country of
UNHCR": The UN surrogate state and refugee policy in the Middle East), New Issues in
Refugee Research Paper No. 201 (2011)). Considerable thanks are due to Jeff Crisp for
support, editing and insight. The views expressed are those of the author.
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INTRODUCTION

Many gaps in the protection of refugees relate to a de facto transfer of
responsibility for managing refugee policy from sovereign states to United
Nations (UN) agencies. This phenomenon can be seen in dozens of countries
throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, where the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the UN Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) manage refugee camps,
register newly arrived asylum-seekers, carry out refugee status
determination, and administer education, health, livelihood and other social
welfare programs. As other writers have observed, when the UN carries out
'2
'
these roles, it acts to a great extent as a "surrogate state" or a "blue state
performing a "state substitution role," 3 but without the capacity to fully
substitute for a host government.4 Such situations have been labeled "legal

I Amy Slaughter & Jeff Crisp, A surrogate state? The role of UNHCR in protracted
refugee situations, in UNITED NATIONS, PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS 123 (Gil
Loescher et al. eds., 2008).
2 Riccardo Bocco, UNRWA and the PalestinianRefugees: A History within a History, 28
REFUGEE SURV. Q. 229, 234 (2010) (describing UNRWA as a "blue state" performing a
"quasi-state function" for Palestinian refugees).
3 Volker Turk, Dir. of Int'l Protection for UNHCR, UNHCR's Role in Supervising Int'l
Prot. Standards in the Context of its Mandate, Keynote Address at the International
Conference on Forced Displacement, Protection Standards, Supervision of the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol and Other International Instruments, York University,
Toronto (May 17-20, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.unhcr.org/4bf4O6a56.html).
' Volker Turk & Elizabeth Eyster, Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR, 22 INT'L J.
OF REFUGEE L. 159, 163 (2010).
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anomalies, 5 and it is UNHCR policy to avoid the operation of such "parallel
services." 6 Yet, such parallel services continue to be widespread. Addressing
these challenges will be a key task if any government in the wake of the
Arab Spring seeks to improve its system of refugee reception and
protection, 7 and may be essential to reverse a trend toward violence 8against
forced migrants in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
The primary solution offered to date, endorsed by both UNHCR and
some of its sharpest critics, has been to refocus attention on the primacy of
state responsibility. A refugee protection strategy focused on getting host
governments to replace the UN surrogate state, however, is not likely to be
practically or politically viable in many countries. Using Arab states in the
Middle East 9 as a focal point, I wish to propose an alternative approach for
building a political foundation for refugee rights. The argument offered is
that the existence of a UN surrogate state provides important advantages to
some host governments and can sometimes become a more viable political
foundation for refugee protection than conventional notions of state
responsibility. Although unsettling to traditional assumptions about state
responsibility, there are good reasons to seek such alternative strategies
which may increase the political will of governments to protect refugees in
the global south.
To be clear, I do not argue that state-to-UN responsibility shift is an
ideal arrangement. There are some essential components of refugee
protection that only a sovereign state may deliver. Any situation that leads to
a perception that UNHCR is a complete substitute for a government is bound

' Guglielmo Verdirame, Human Rights andRefugees: The Caseof Kenya, 12 J. REFUGEE
STUD. 54 (1999).
6 UNHCR, Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas,
113 (2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ab8e7f72.html
[hereinafter
Policy
on
Refugee
Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas] ("As a general rule, when working in urban areas,
UNHCR will avoid the establishment of separate and parallel services for its beneficiaries, and
will instead seek to reinforce existing fully authorized delivery systems, whether they are
public, private or community-based.").
7 See, e.g., Melissa Fleming, UNHCR chief applauds Egypt, calls for humanitarian
access to Libya, UNHCR (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/4d95c3239.html (last visited
Apr. 24, 2011) (UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Ant6nio Guterres expressed
hope for "a new beginning for refugee protection in Egypt.").
8 See Cynthia Johnston, Violence at Egypt border points to migration shifts, REUTERS
(July 30, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/30/idUSLS359973
(illustrating
violence against forced migrants in Egypt); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2010 Human Rights Report:
Egypt (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160456.pdf.
9 The Middle East is not a precisely defined region, though in this paper I am focusing on
the region southeast of Europe, north of Sudan and east of Iran. I am excluding Israel and
Turkey, since they do not have Arab governments. I am also not addressing the states of the
Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) where the politics on refugees may differ.
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to produce disappointment and failure.' 0 UNHCR in particular has expressed
concern that urban refugees sometimes develop "unrealistic expectations"1
for the protection outcomes that UNHCR will actually be able to deliver.
Nevertheless, absent a strategic change in the incentives for host
governments, reversing the responsibility shift phenomenon would not be an
easy feat to achieve. Moreover, there are many aspects of refugee protection
that the UN can deliver effectively, and sometimes with more high quality
service and responsiveness, than many governments. The UN's refugee
agencies should develop their capacity to accept such shifts of responsibility
strategically and to use them as opportunities to advance refugee protection.
Responsibility shift, when used, must be limited and defined in scope so that
the lines of accountability are clear, and the expectations realistic.
This Article begins with an overview of the origins of responsibility
shift and offers observations about some of the debates and critiques that
have developed around the issue. I then develop a theory about the role of
the UN surrogate state in the refugee policy of Arab states, connecting recent
scholarship about citizenship in the Arab world with historical assessments
about the emergence of responsibility shift in the early days of the
Palestinian refugee crisis after 1948. Lastly, I highlight some of the major
limitations on the UN as a substitute for state-based responsibility and
propose ways in which UNHCR can more effectively use limited
responsibility shift as a refugee protection strategy.
1.THE ORIGINS OF RESPONSIBILITY SHIFT

The responsibility shift phenomenon grows from a basic inequality
between the "global north" and "global south." In general, developed nations
of the northern hemisphere accept relatively small asylum burdens while
most refugees largely remain in developing countries of the southern
hemisphere. 12 As Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp explain, many host
governments in the global south suggested "that they would only admit and
refrain from refoulement of refugees if the needs of such populations were
fully met by the international community."' 13 This is a daunting challenge,
since third country resettlement is accessible to only a small minority of the
world's refugees, and governments increasingly view forced migration as a
threat which needs to be contained. 4
10 Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas, supra note 6, at 14-15, T
84.
Id.
Mariano Florentino Cuellar, Refugee Security and the Organizational Logic of Legal
Mandates, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 583, 622 (2006).
"3 Slaughter & Crisp, supra note 1, at 128.
14 Id at 126.
12
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The implementation of international refugee law has been heavily
shaped by this basic north-south tension. As James C. Hathaway observed,
the driving purpose of refugee law "is not specifically to meet the needs of
the refugees themselves (as both the humanitarian and human rights
paradigms would suggest), but rather is to govern disruptions of regulated
international migration in accordance with the interests of states."' 15 The
stalemate that results from the north-south gap has been bridged, to some
extent at least, by what Mariano-Florentino Cuellar calls the "grand
compromise" of global refugee policy,' 6 amounting to an ad hoc form of
burden sharing which took shape because other more desirable arrangements
have been thwarted. UNHCR's ability to deliver aid to desperate refugees in
the south offers traditional northern donor states a channel by which to
funnel monetary assistance, while simultaneously helping host governments
in the south keep refugees from imposing untenable burdens on their own
societies. 17
The presence of a UN surrogate state, however, tends to complement a
tendency to see refugees as a problem to be managed rather than as people
with rights.18 When host governments deflect the burden of caring for
refugee populations onto international actors, they weaken the normal
connection between territorial sovereignty and state responsibility for people
who are present in their territory. Slaughter and Crisp describe a general
pattern that has emerged from this process. Host governments confine
themselves to respect for the principle of non-refoulement and the provision
of security. 19
At the same time, UNHCR and partner humanitarian agencies assume
effective responsibility for delivering direct assistance to refugees . 20
UNHCR in the south often takes over unnatural roles "in order to fill gaps in
the international refugee regime,",2 1 and thus slow the downward spiral of
refugee protection that would have otherwise occurred. It should be noted

1" James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31
HARV. INT'L L. J. 129, 133 (1990); see also Anne Evans Barnes, Realizing protection space
for Iraqi refugees: UNHCR in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE
RESEARCH (UNHCR) ("Carving out protection space is not without its obstacles; for in
addition to meeting the protection needs of refugees, UNHCR must simultaneously meet the
concerns of states.").
16 Cuellar, supra note 12, at 622.
17 Id. at 659.
'8 James C. Hathaway, Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree to Just 'Date ?, 20 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 349, 350 (2007).
19

20

21

Slaughter & Crisp, supra note 1, at 124.

Id.
Id. at

123.
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that while responsibility shift does not take hold everywhere in the global
south,22 it has become nearly universal throughout the Middle East.
While the precise division of labor between states and the UN varies
from country to country, the general pattern of responsibility shift loosely
fits the classic distinction between positive and negative liberties. Negative
liberties are defined by the absence of something, most typically, a person's
autonomy free of interference from the state. 23 Host governments' role is
limited to protection of negative liberties. For refugees, the critical security
threats of refoulement and detention emanate from the state itself through
deportation, police harassment, and immigration enforcement.
As a result, host governments can substantially live up to their end of
the bargain by literally doing nothing. They can "protect" refugees simply
by restraining the impact of restrictive immigration policies through a policy
of benign neglect. By contrast, positive liberty requires the presence of
something, 24 typically founded on the understanding that to enjoy genuine
autonomy a person needs to have certain things, typically involving either
the provision of a service or the distribution of goods so as to overcome
material inequality.2 5 The heavy burden of addressing refugees' positive
liberties typically falls to UNHCR and its partners who carry out registration
and status determination, healthcare, education, nutrition, and livelihood
assistance.
Keeping refugees apart from local populations and dependent on a
separate UN-operated aid system sometimes finds support in refugee
communities. Because of the de facto division of labor in these contexts,
refugees learn to expect very little from the host government and a great deal
from the UN. In many situations, refugees come to prefer UNHCR over host
governments as their protector, orienting their aspirations toward third
country resettlement-primarily, to the United States, Canada, and
Australia.2 6 For instance, Katarzyna Grabska' 27has quoted refugees in Egypt
as saying, "We live in a country of UNHCR.

2 Notable exceptions include South Africa, India, and Ecuador, among others. Explaining

why some states opt not to rely on the UN surrogate state would require additional
comparative study.
23 IAN CARTER, Positive and Negative Liberty, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2012 ed. Mar. 5, 2012), available
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr20l2/entries/liberty-positive-negative/.
24 Id.

at

25 See LAWRENCE CROCKER, POSITIVE LIBERTY 2 (1980).

16 Slaughter & Crisp, supra note 1,at 132.
27 Katarzyna Grabska, Brothers or Poor Cousins? Rights, Policies and the Well-being of
Refugees in Egypt, in FORCED DISPLACEMENT: WHY RIGHTS MATTER 71, 87 (Katarzyna
Grabska & Lyla Mehta eds., 2008).
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Palestinian refugees in the Middle East are the paradigmatic example of
this phenomenon, with a national narrative that resists tawtin (local
integration) and argues that the UN has special responsibility to care for
them. 28 But this view is not exclusive to Palestinians. Separation from the
local society can support a political orientation focused on resettlement or
29
repatriation, which for exile political movements facilitates recruitment.
Refugees may also resist local integration because there remains a tense
with the host population or in order to maintain national identity
relationship
30
exile.
in
II. CRITICISM AND CONSENSUS

Conventional notions of state responsibility render accountability
relatively straightforward so long as sovereign states take a paramount role
in providing support. But when UNHCR acts like a surrogate state, it
becomes less clear which entity is ultimately practically responsible for
protection failures. In theory, the principle of state responsibility still holds.
For instance, states can be held accountable for relying on errant decisions in
refugee status determination made by UN agencies. 31 But this theory is
difficult to apply in situations where there are no effective judicial
authorities accessible to refugees. In situations of responsibility shift, the
sovereign state exists only far in the background. A legal system that cannot
reach the frontline actors will risk irrelevance in the real lives of refugees.
the buck
With ambiguity about who is responsible, institutions often "pass
32
amongst themselves" for actually implementing abstract norms.
The practical reality that UNHCR and its staff wield real power over
refugees has produced a situation where activists and scholars sometimes
"criticize the good guys"33 for violating refugee rights.34 Such criticisms

See generally Michael Kagan, The (Relative) Decline of Palestinian Exceptionalism
and its Consequences for Refugee Studies in the Middle East, 22 J. REFUGEE STUD. 417
(2009).
29 Slaughter & Crisp, supra note 1,at 135; see also Jeff Crisp, No solutions in sight: The
problem ofprotractedrefugee situations in Africa, in NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH 5-6
(UNHCR).
30 Slaughter & Crisp, supra note 1,at 136.
3' See D. v. Turkey, App. No. 24245/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 22, 2006).
32 Katarzyna Grabska & Lyla Mehta, The Politics of Rights, in FORCED DISPLACEMENT:
WHY RIGHTS MATTER 71, 87 (Katarzyna Grabska & Lyla Mehta eds., 2008).
"3 Albie Sachs, Forward to BARBARA HARRELL-BOND & GUGLIELMO VERDIRAME,
2

RIGHTS IN EXILE: JANUS-FACED HUMANITARIANISM, at ix (2005).

" I have made criticisms of UNHCR for violating due process rights in refugee status
determination (RSD), though these critiques are less sweeping than those of other writers
discussed here. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, The Beleaguered Gatekeeper: Protection Challenges
Posed by UNHCR Refugee Status Determination, 18 INT'L J.REFUGEE L. 1 (2006).
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sharpened with the 2005 publication of former High Commissioner Sadako
Ogata's book, The Turbulent Decade.35 One group of commentators, notably
comprised of Barbara Harrell-Bond, 36 Guglielmo Verdirame, 37 Zachary
Lomo 38 and Jacob Stevens, 39 has been especially critical of UNHCR,
blaming the agency for usurping the responsibility of states for refugee
policy and facilitating refugee rights violations in the process. The central
thesis of these critics is that UNHCR's primary institutional motivation is
the pursuit of donor money and institutional power, rather than refugee
welfare, and that UNHCR
thus seeks to "control" refugees so as to benefit
4
and perpetuate itself. '
One reason why some critics place primary blame on the UN for the
creation of the UN surrogate state is a deeply embedded assumption that
entities always seek greater power for themselves. Many post-colonial
countries have been zealous in guarding the traditional
S42 concept of state
sovereignty over aspirations for global cooperation.
As a result, if
functions normally assigned to sovereign states shift from these states to the
UN, one could easily assume that self-interested UN agencies must have
seized greater turf for themselves at the expense of weak host governments.
Appearances on the ground can often feed this view. In large refugee
settlements in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, one can find a humanitarian
infrastructure dwarfing local government, dominated by international
agencies based in the West, funded mainly by Western states, and led by
intemational staff. This gives refugee policy an air of neo-colonialism; 43 this
can unfortunately further encourage criticism of the UN for pushing

3' Sadako Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s
(2005).
36 See generally BARBARA HARRELL-BOND & GUGLIELMO VERDIRAME, RIGHTS IN
EXILE: JANUS-FACED HUMANITARIANISM (2005).
37 id.

38 Zachary Lomo, The Struggle for Protection of the Rights of Refugees and IDPs in
Africa: Making the Existing InternationalLegal Regime Work, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 268
(2000).
31 Jacob Stevens, Prisons of the Stateless, 42 NEW LEFT REVIEW (2006), available at
http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2644 (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
40 Id; Harrell-Bond & Verdirame, supra note 36, at 34, 272.
4' Harrell-Bond & Verdirame, supra note 36, at 288.
42 THOMAS G. WEISS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND HOW TO FIX IT

20, 22 (2009).
" Cf Namita Wahi, Human Rights Accountability of the 1MF and the World Bank: A
Critiqueof Existing Mechanisms and Articulation of a Theory of HorizontalAccountability, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 331, 344 (discussing the idea that the IMF and World Bank
"represent neocolonial measures by the West to maintain its hegemony over the developing
world" by using control of financial resources to take economic and political control).
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sovereign governments aside and perpetuating such inequitable power
dynamics in host countries.
Many of the critics' specific allegations about UNHCR in the Ogata era
have been pointedly contested. 4 But for present purposes, it is the
provocative macro-critique that UNHCR wants to take power away from
states that deserves some attention. By focusing on UNHCR's allegedly selfinterested motivations, this group of critics tends to deemphasize host
governments as decisive actors in shaping refugee policy in the geopolitical
south. This allows for the assumption that governments follow UNHCR's
direction 45 and thus the conclusion that UNHCR is the primary cause of
protection failures.
The implicit assumption that a sovereign state would not want a UN
agency to usurp its authority is, in some cases, lacking in a nuanced analysis
of practical facts on the ground. The concept of global governance, which
has emerged from the field of international relations, offers more useful
analytical tools to understand how states may relate to agencies like UNHCR
on the ground.4 6 In particular, the responsibility shift phenomenon may be
best understood by extending an analysis recently developed by Thomas
Weiss. Weiss argues that in the twenty-first century, the UN confronts a
paradox in that international governance should be more essential than ever
''47
to confront what Kofi Annan called "problems withoutS passports,
-yet
48
states continue to be reluctant to surrender their sovereignty.
The UN is not monolithic, and the diversity of institutions that fall
under its umbrella helps, to some extent, to respond to this challenge.
Scholars sometimes distinguish a "first United Nations," which is a "stage or
arena for state decision-making," from the "second United Nations,"
consistin& of semi-autonomous intergovernmental secretariats and
agencies. 9 It is not at all surprising that a state might fiercely resist
surrendering any sovereign prerogatives to "first UN" bodies like the
Security Council, but a state might find it advantageous to shift some

4 See Nicholas Morris, Prisons of the Stateless: A response to New Left Review, in NEW
ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH (UNHCR).
's See, e.g., Harrell-Bond & Verdirame, supra note 28, at 335-38 (arguing that local
integration received too little attention in Kenya and Uganda because UNHCR and its donors
were dedicated to encampment and repatriation); Lomo, supra note 38, at 282 (arguing that
Kenya confined refugees to camps because UNHCR made this a condition for receiving aid).
46 See THOMAS. G. WEISS & RAMESH THAKUR, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE UN: AN

UNFINISHED JOURNEY 6 (2010).

" Weiss, supra note 42, at 4.
41 ld.at

19.

'9 Id. at 8. The concept of a first and second UN is originally traced to lnis Claude Jr. See
INIS CLAUDE JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1956).

THE PROBLEMS

AND PROSPECTS
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functional aspects of sovereignty onto "second UN" agencies like UNHCR.
Even if this pattern takes hold ad hoc, it offers a practical mechanism by
which the UN has operated to partially bridge the gap between the need for
global cooperation and the continued preeminence of state-centrism. This is
what makes the grand compromise of refugee policy possible.
The global grand compromise of refugee policy inverts many of the
usual incentives for states. In the north, governments are usually assumed to
want to place firm limits on the class of migrants who will be legally
recognized as refugees so as to limit their obligations to let them stay. But in
the global south, governments have an incentive to do something their
northern counterparts typically resist: expand the definition of a refugee.
Formally labeling more migrants as "refugees" facilitates state-to-UN
responsibility shift since refugees fall under UNHCR's mandate, 50and at the
same time, operates to marginalize migrants from the host society.
Once the logic of responsibility shift takes hold, host governments have
reason to keep refugees segregated and highly visible in order to maintain
the pressure on the international community to continue to support their care
and maintenance. 51 Host governments become firmly opposed to local
integration,52 eliminating one of the classic durable solutions that might
resolve a refugee situation. 53 They thus oppose includinf refugee aid in their
general development programs as UNHCR advocates, leading UNHCR to
develop parallel and separate assistance programs.5 5 Therefore, when stateto-UN responsibility shift happens, it should not be hastily assumed that it is
the primary purpose of the UN to facilitate this shift. There are powerful
political forces that lead states in the south to want to transfer their
responsibilities to the United Nations for their own sovereign benefit.
While some major critics of UNHCR oversimplify political dynamics in
blaming UNHCR for responsibility shift, it is interesting that critics largely
agree with the official UNHCR policy regarding the remedy for the resulting
tensions and conflicts. Beyond the blow-by-blow exchanges about the
culpability of UNHCR for building the surrogate state, both sides agree that
state-to-UN responsibility shift is fundamentally a bad thing and that it
should be reversed. But how might that be accomplished? Stevens, for
example, recommends that UNHCR should refocus "on enforcing the

50 Michael Kagan, Legal Refugee Recognition in the Urban South: Formal v. de facto

Refugee Status, 24 REFUGE 1, 15-16 (2007).
" Marc Sommers, Young, Male and Pentecostal: Urban Refugees in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, 14 J.REFUGEE STUD. 347 (2001).
52 Crisp, supra note 29, at 3-4.
11 Slaughter & Crisp, supra note 1, at 131.
14 Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas, supra note 6,
11 Slaughter & Crisp, supranote 1, at 131-32.
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Convention provisions upon its signatories." 56 A proposal for this type of
approach has been offered for Egypt by Tarek Badawy,57 who argues that
UNHCR should have ceased conducting refugee status determination with
Egypt's ratification of the Refugee Convention 58 in 1981; 59 and, that in
2004, UNHCR should not have extended temporary protection to the
Sudanese in order to pressure Egyptian authorities to take responsibility for
them under the recent Egypt-Sudan Four Freedoms
Agreement.60 Others
61
scale.
have called for similar approaches on a wider
These proposals are built on the assumption that as soon as UNHCR
relinquishes the reins of power over refugee policy in the global south,
normal state responsibility for refugee protection will be reestablished. But
states might not react to a UNHCR withdrawal in such a positive manner.
When a host state stands back, ad hoe UNHCR responses to refugee
emergencies lay the groundwork for enduring parallel structures that allow
host states to avoid protection responsibilities-indefinitely. 62 In this view,
UNHCR is pressured by exigent circumstances and sometimes lacks
strategic foresight, but that is not the primary source of the problem. Even if
fully committed in principle to state responsibility, UNHCR is often trapped
into accepting quasi-government functions indefinitely, fearful that if it pulls
back, refugees would simply
be abandoned because host governments would
63
be unwilling to step in.
III.

REFUGEE POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Like other troubled regions, the Middle East region hosts millions of
refugees, just as it produces them. However, by conventional legal measures,

56

Stevens, supra note 39.

TAREK BADAWY, THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN EGYPT AND
THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES: PROBLEMS AND
57

RECOMMENDATIONS (CARIM AS 2010/07, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute, 2010).
51 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545
[hereinafter Refugee Convention].
'9
60

Id. at 12.

61

Mauro De Lorenzo, Dignity, Safety and Health for Refugees, WASH. POST (May 2,

Id. at 14.

2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/01/
AR2007050101056.html ("The solution is to remove UNHCR from the equation and help
national governments to determine refugee status fairly and then adjudicate decisions in their
own courts.").
62 UNHCR, Protracted Refugee Situations: A discussion paper for the High
Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges, UNHCR/DPC/2008/Doc.02, 13-14,
53-59 (2008).
63 Slaughter & Crisp, supra note 1, at 132.
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most countries in this region have done very little to implement their
obligations to protect refugees. Very few have signed the Refugee
Convention 64 and none have passed domestic refugee legislation. Indeed, by
these traditional legal criteria, refugee policy in the Middle East region is
much less developed than in the Eastern and Sub-Saharan African regions.
In a 2006 article, Ruben Zaiotti examined the alarming state of refugee
policy in the Middle East region. He wrote:
Despite its importance, throughout their recent history Middle
Eastern states have not paid much attention to the issue of forced
migration. Apart from the Palestinian case, the question has
maintained a low profile on their political agendas. No formal
provision regulating the status of refugees has been devised, and
few countries in the region have acceded to the main legal
instruments defining the international refugee regime. Policies
towards these individuals therefore have been formulated on an
ad hoc basis. As a result refugees have enjoyed few guarantees
and minimal protection.
Zaiotti's analysis reflects two analytical lacunae that are common to
studies of refugee issues in the region. First, Zaiotti assumes, incorrectly in
my view, that Palestinian and non-Palestinian refugees are entirely separate
categories that cannot be examined together, even though they exist together
in the same host countries. 66 Second, Zaiotti asks state-centric questions to
examine whether international refugee law has been implemented, such as
"Have states ratified the Convention? Have they passed legislation?" 67 and
"Have Arab states developed a successful regional regime to govern refugee
status?" 68 Asking these simple questions leads to the general conclusion that
there is basically no refugee policy in the Middle East region, that there are

6' In the region covered by this article, only Egypt, Israel and Yemen ratified the Refugee
Convention. The Refugee Convention has found greater acceptance in North Africa, with
Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco all having ratified it.
65 Ruben Zaiotti, Dealing with non-PalestinianRefugees in the Middle East: Policies and
Practicesin an Uncertain Environment, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 333, 334 (2006).
66 For a development of this argument, see Kagan, The (Relative) Decline of Palestinian
Exceptionalism and its Consequencesfor Refugee Studies in the Middle East,supranote 28.
67 For an overview of laws relevant to refugees in the region, see LEILA HILAL &
SHAHIRA SAMY, ASYLUM AND MIGRATION IN THE MASHREK 67-69 (2008).
68 See Barnes, supra note 15, at 17 ("In addition, in the Middle East, a regional regime

similar to those in Africa or Latin America does not exist. A document that may have
represented a starting point for such a regime; the Declaration on the Protection of Refugees
and Displaced Persons in the Arab World, was drafted in 1992. In 1994 the Arab Convention
on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries was adopted, but has not been
ratified.").
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only refugee problems and - at best - occasionally some ad hoc and
discretionary steps taken to alleviate suffering for short periods of time.
Yet, a refugee arriving in a major Arab state will not encounter a total
vacuum. There are some systems in place to receive people fleeing
persecution; some refugees are able to find shelter, although many people
are likely to fall through the cracks, and the amount of protection available is
certainly quite limited. The systems that exist on the ground for refugees in
the Middle East region are essentially off the radar screen of conventional
thinking in the field of international law, primarily because they rely on
shifting responsibility from the sovereign state to the UN. The difference in
the Middle East is that there are two relevant UN refugee agencies:
UNRWA, for Palestinians; and UNHCR, for non-Palestinians-and urban
settings have long been more prominent than rural encampments of refugees.
The surrogate state pattern that Slaughter and Crisp date to the 1960s in
Africa developed even earlier in the Middle East with the establishment of
UNRWA in the first years of the Palestinian refugee crisis. A desire by Arab
states to maintain the visibility of the Palestinian refugee issue in
international politics has long been noted as one of the central reasons why
Arab states preferred to maintain a separate UN apparatus in the form of
UNRWA, rather than incorporate Palestinians into the new international
refugee regime in 1950-1951. 69 But focusing on why UNRWA was kept
separate from UNHCR overlooks the threshold question as to why so much
emphasis was placed on the UN to begin with.
IV. CITIZENS, FOREIGNERS AND SPONSORS

Arab states have been generally classified in the international
community as "developing" countries, but most have traditionally had strong
central governments with elaborate bureaucracies which regulate the status
of and deliver services to their populations as part of a social contract
between citizens and autocrats. 70 As a recent UNHCR study observed,
"Cities such as Aleppo, Amman, Beirut and Damascus are relatively
prosperous and expensive when compared to cities such as Accra,
Khartoum, Nairobi or New Delhi.'
With the possible exceptions of
Lebanon, Yemen and post-Baathist Iraq, where central governments are
weak, one risks making an incorrect generalization to think that Arab
69 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 206-07 (1991).

70 See Randa Alami & Massoud Karshenas, Deficient Social Policies Have Helped Spark
the
Arab
Spring,
70
DEV.
VIEWPOINT,
Feb.
2012,
available
at
http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/deficient-social-policies-have-helped-spark-thearab-spring.html.
71 Jeff Crisp et al., Surviving in the City: A Review of UNHCR's operation for Iraqi
refugees in urban areas of Jordan Lebanon and Syria, PDES/2009/03, 34 (2009).
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governments are unable to administer refugee policy on their own. It would
be more accurate to say that they are unwilling, and there are specific
reasons why. To understand these reasons, it is important to examine the
ways in which Arab states have become accustomed to dealing with foreign
populations.
There are substantial ideological obstacles to local integration of any
migrants in Arab states.72 In a recent study, Gianluca Parolin
observed, "Citizenship in the Arab world is essentially defined by the
individual's membership in a kin group, in a religious community and in a
nation-state." 73 Depending on the political circumstances, communal
affiliation can work for or against integration of a group of people or specific
population. In several cases around the Arab world, whole kin groups have
been de-nationalized or, in a few cases, naturalized on a communal basis,
or marginalizing
usually to serve a local political purpose by privileging
74
regime.
ruling
the
to
disloyal
or
loyal
as
seen
groups
Prospects for naturalization of foreigners are limited because "if not
attributed by paternal descent, nationality in the Arab world is essentially
closed., 75 The attachment of a citizen to the nation to which he or she has
blood ties is so strong that Arab states generally resist the idea of granting
citizenship to a person with connections to another state. Some Arab states
dispute whether a second nationality may be acquired voluntarily; some
consider it impossible without the consent of the first state of nationality
because of the principle of perpetual allegiance, while others view it as
automatically leading to loss of nationality in order to prevent dual
nationality.7 In essence, citizenship in the Arab world is founded on jus
sanguinis principles understood through the lens of patriarchal kinship. 77
But while citizenship in Arab states remains inaccessible to most
foreigners, Arab countries typically tolerate and in many cases welcome
large populations of long-term foreign residents. This would seem to be
contradictory in Western states where systems of immigration control are

72

See Hilal & Samy, supra note 67, at 66.

73

GIANLUCA PAOLO PAROLIN, CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD: KIN, RELIGION AND

NATION STATE 115 (2009).
74 ld. at H16-17.
75

76

Id.
Id. at 108.

77 Jus sanguinis translated from Latin, means "right of the blood," and generally means
citizenship bestowed on the children of existing citizens. See STEPHEN M. LEGOMSKY &
CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, 1290 (5th ed.

2009). 1 use patriarchal kinship to refer to a system of understanding family identity that
privileges masculine parentage.
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closely connected to naturalization. 78 In the Arab world, where immigration
is not a pipeline to naturalization, the long-term residence of non-citizens is
managed through the widespread usage of the kefala (sponsorship) system,
which has now become a source of severe criticism by the human rights
community because of its reported connections to worker exploitation.
The kefala system is in some respects an extreme version of work
permit systems used in many countries, in that it begins with an employer's
application for a visa for an employee.7 9 However, its distinctive feature is
the level of control given to employers over their workers, including their
ability to move freely, obtain driver's licenses or bank accounts, often
8
0
severely restricting workers' ability to seek alternative employment.
Especially in the sphere of domestic work, social scientists have explained
mistreatment of workers as a reinforcement of patriarchal social structures in
which the "fictive kin" who work as maids and nannies are treated as
subordinate parts of the family structure.81 While this subordination
heightens abuse, it may also entail a paternalistic sense of obligation on the
part of some employers. 82 It might also be suggested that fictive kinship
involving foreigners operates as a natural extension of more traditional
kinship-based systems of citizenship.
V. THE SYMBOLIC ROLE OF THIRD PARTY SPONSORS

The kefala system is a legalist means of regulating relations between
employers and foreign workers, but it is not used everywhere in the region.
Egypt in particular has been a noted exception where the law does not
necessarily allow employment of foreigners in most cases, but authorities
tolerate it on a wide scale nonetheless. 83 In Egypt, migrant workers may
have relatively more control of their lives not because the state protects
them, but because the state ignores them. An extra-legal existence in a
" For example, in the U.S., foreigners who acquire legal permanent residence are
potentially eligible in the future to naturalize as a citizen. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (2006). It is
interesting, at least as a hypothetical problem, to contemplate what it would mean for the status
of legal immigrants in the United States if this path to citizenship were removed.
79 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ISLAND OF HAPPINESS: EXPLOITATION OF
MIGRANT WORKERS ON SAADIYAT ISLAND, ABU DHABI 28 (2009).
80 Id. at 29.
8' Bridget Anderson, DOING THE DIRTY WORK: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DOMESTIC

LABOUR

145 (2000); Ray Jureidini & Nayla Moukarbel, Female Sri Lankan domestic workers in
Lebanon: a case of'contractslavery'?, 30 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 581, 586 (2004).
82 See generally, Ray Jureidini, In the Shadows of Family Life: Toward a History of
Domestic Service in Lebanon, 5 J. MIDDLE EAST WOMEN'S STUD. 74 (2009).
83 Ray Jureidini, Irregular Workers in Egypt: Migrant and Refugee Domestic Workers,
II INT'L J. MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 75, 78 (2009).
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country that maintains lax enforcement mechanisms may be relatively
preferable to aggressive enforcement of a restrictive legal regime. 84 But this
still leaves a legal sword over the heads of migrants, where, under local law,
they may have no right to do what they are doing. In neither the kefala
system nor in the case of migrants living outside the law are foreigners
legally recognized as people with autonomy over their own lives. In kefala,
the legal relationship between employer and employee appears most
analogous to a parent and child, or alternatively, master and slave or
servant. 85 What is critical here is that the state recognizes the right of the
sponsor to have an employee and to make decisions about the employee
more than it recognizes the rights of the worker. The foreigner's relationship
to the state is mitigated through the third party sponsor, thus facilitating the
hosting of foreigners without creating a binding relationship between
foreigners and host states.
This idea of a third party sponsor is important for understanding how
Arab states have responded to the presence of refugees in their countries,
beginning with the Palestinians in 1948. At the birth of the Palestinian
refugee crisis, Arab states faced a political challenge; there was, and largely
still is, a popular Arab consensus insistent on Palestinian return as the only
acceptable solution to the refugee crisis in the region. 86 Yet while Arab
states have supported and often encouraged this sentiment among their
citizenry, Arab governments have lacked the power to force Israel to accept
repatriation. 87 Arab host states found themselves insisting that Palestinian
refugees88should go home even though they lacked the power to make this
happen.
Shifting responsibility for the refugees to the UN defused this tension. It
accommodated the practical reality of long term exile without surrendering
in princile the insistence on return as the only acceptable permanent
solution. For this political strategy to work, it would not have been
adequate for Arab states to simply persuade the international community to
share the resource burden of hosting the refugees via humanitarian or
development aid. Arab states wanted the shift of responsibility for the
refugees to the international community to be highly visible, in what Jalal
' See Hilal & Samy, supra note 67, at 10 ("Laws on migration that have been adopted in
the Mashrek countries are mainly repressive and provide no, or very few, rights for
migrants.").
8 See generally Jureidini & Moukarbel, supra note 81.
86 See Jalal Husseini, The Arab States and the Refugee Issue: A Retrospective View, in
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 435, 437 (Eyal Benvenisti et al. eds., 2007)
(describing an "Arab consensus" favoring repatriation).
8 Husseini, supra note 86, at 441.
88 ldat 441,449-50.
89 Id. at441.
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Husseini calls "the necessary public emphasis on UN involvement." 90 This
symbolism was important enough that when UNRWA was established, Arab
states asked that "UN" be added to its name, instead of the original
suggestion that it be called "Near East Relief and Works Agency
(NERWA)."'
Palestinians were not the first refugee group to be deliberately blocked
from integration in host countries in order to serve political agendas. In
December 1946, the United Nations established the International Refugee
Organization (IRO). 92 The IRO's constitution mandated it to help refugees
find new permanent homes except "in the case of Spanish Republicans [who
should] establish themselves temporarily in order to enable them to return to
Spain when the present Falangist regime is succeeded by a democratic
regime." 93 What was new in the Palestinian case was that a new narrative
discourse developed by which host states could better justify a liminal status
for Palestinian refugees: that the refugees should be
94 left in the hands of the
UN, because the UN was "to blame" for their exile.
This UN responsibility thesis 95 is fairly unique to the Palestinian case,
but the general pattern of state-to-UN responsibility shift is the common
foundation of refugee policy for both Palestinian and non-Palestinian
refugees in Arab host states.96 The arrangement that emerged with UNRWA
in the Middle East fits Slaughter and Crisp's description of the UNHCR
surrogate state in Sub-Saharan Africa. 97 Both host governments and the
refugee community opposed local integration. 98 Host governments largely
limited their involvement to the regularization of refugees' residency
status. 99 UNRWA, and later UNHCR, set up registration, education, health,
and other social welfare systems separate from those operated by the host
governments.
The precise demarcation of responsibility varies, with the

9' Id. at 443.
91 Id.
92 G.A. Res. 62(l), U.N. Doc. A/Res/62 (I) (Dec. 15, 1946).
9' Id. Annex, pmbl.; see also id. art. 2(l)(c).
9 Husseini, supra note 86, at 443.
9' For a critique of the "UN responsibility thesis" as applied to Palestinians, see Kagan,
The (Relative) Decline of Palestinian Exceptionalism and its Consequences for Refugee
Studies in the Middle East,supra note 28.
96 For descriptions of the role of UNHCR in some of these states, see generally Kagan,
The BeleagueredGatekeeper, supra note 34; Crisp et al., supra note 71; Grabska, supra note
27.
17 Slaughter & Crip, supranote 1, at 131-32.
98 See Husseini, supra note 86, at 442.
99 Id. at 449, 453-55.
100 UNRWA, for example, operates its own schools and health clinics catering to
Palestinian refugees. UNHCR conducts refugee status determination in most Arab states,
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governments of Syria and Jordan offering more services to refugees than
Lebanon.' 01 Yet, UNRWA remains central to Palestinian welfare throughout
the region. As Nicholas Morris wrote, "UNRWA has direct responsibilities
broadly analogous to10 2those of a government's health, education and social
welfare authorities."'
A key lesson from the early days of UNRWA is that responsibility shift
offers symbolic political benefits to host states in addition to its utility in
facilitating a shift of resource burdens. Governments have also used
UNHCR's operations to symbolically transfer the burdens for social welfare
to the UN.' 0 3 Along with helping to defray the resource burdens of hosting
refugees, state avoidance of responsibility has helped ameliorate political
sensitivities. 10 4 The fact that refugees in the Arab world typically come from
other Arab League states posed a political problem for host governments that
did not want to accuse fellow Arab states of persecution.' 0 5 It is politically
expedient to leave this task to UNHCR and to portray the refugees' presence
as temporary, as was the original approach Arab States had taken with
Palestinian populations. 06
By combining Husseini's study of the historical origins of Arab state
reliance on UNRWA with Parolin's analysis of Arab citizenship, we can
develop a theory explaining common approaches among Arab states towards
refugees more broadly. First, in general, Arab states are accustomed to
hosting large numbers of foreigners but are not open to offering permanent
integration to them absent exceptional political calculations. Second, shifting
responsibility for refugee populations to UN agencies can provide a ready
explanation for the otherwise contradictory facts of long-term residence and
the non-integration of refugees in Arab states. In the absence of a foreign
state of origin or employment sponsor that can take responsibility for the
migrants, visibly attaching a group of foreigners to the UN can serve to
explain why they cannot be, and need not be, integrated to the host
community.
One can see the symbolic utility of a third party sponsor in the
otherwise anomalous example of Egyptian treatment of Palestinian refugees.
operates its own health program for refugees in Egypt and Lebanon (among others), and in
some cases funds separate refugee schools.
"' Most Palestinian refugees in Jordan are citizens, while in Syria their status is analogous
to permanent residents.
102 NICHOLAS MORRIS,

WHAT PROTECTION MEANS FOR UNRWA IN CONCEPT AND

PRACTICE 4 (2008) availableat http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pubs08/
ProtectionReport-mar08.pdf (last visited 15 February 2008).
I'3Grabska, supra note 27, at 86.
104 Id. at 80.
-0 Id. at 76.
106 Id. at 77.
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Egypt is the only state bordering Israel/Palestine where UNRWA does not
operate.10 7 The historical explanation for this is unclear. According to
official accounts from the United Nations, UNRWA chose not to provide
assistance to Palestinians in Egypt because of insufficient resources. 0 8 But
according to other accounts, the Egyptian Government decided not to
request UNRWA's assistance because it did not want to encourage
Palestinian refugees to stay inside Egypt.10 9 While the number of Palestinian
refugees who entered Egypt in 1948 was relatively small, 110 Egyptian
authorities sought to contain the refugees in the Gaza Strip, which was under
Egyptian military occupation from 1949 to 1967 and where UNRWA did
operate. 1
For those few Palestinians who remained in Egypt, the Egyptian
Government essentially invented a third party sponsor where none otherwise
existed. For Palestinians in Egypt in the 1950s, the functions that might be
carried out today by UNHCR were undertaken instead by the Cairo-backed
"Government of All Palestine" (GAP), which at least for consular purposes
in Egypt operated as a Palestinian government in exile." 2 Beginning in
1949, Palestinian refugees in Egypt received travel documents and birth
certificates from GAP and were allowed to receive residence permits from
documents
the Egyptian authorities." 13 In 1960, Egypt replaced the GAP
11 4
government.
Egyptian
the
by
issued
documents
travel
with new
With the notable exception of Egypt, the theory I suggest is that many
Arab governments are more likely to acquiesce to the presence of refugees
on their territory if responsibility for their maintenance and ultimate
departure from the country is visibly assigned to an international body or
other third party. Efforts to integrate refugees are likely to be blocked either
by explicit policy or by the grinding resistance of what Parolin calls the
"silent machinisations" of the state.
Without the UN's role in acting as a
sponsor for refugees, Arab states would be forced to face more directly the
contradiction between the presence and non-integration of refugees. They
107 UNRWA maintains a liaison office in Cairo, but does not carry out refugee assistance

programs in Egypt.
0 Lance Bartholomeusz, The Mandate of UNRWA at 60, 28 REFUGEE SURV.

Q. 452

(2009).
109

OROUB EL-ABED, UNPROTECTED: PALESTINIANS IN EGYPT SINCE 1948, at 36 (2009).

"o Id.at 17.
.

See id.
at 19.
2 Id. at 54 ("[T]he Cairo-based 'Government of All Palestine' had an almost entirely

paper existence, but it did have one real function: It issued travel documents to Palestinians
1960.").
both inEgypt and inthe Gasa Strip from 1949 until
... Id.at 37.
114 ld. at 54.

l1'Parolin, supra note 72, at 128.
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might resolve this contradiction by following the historic Egyptian example,
through the systemic non-enforcement of laws on the books, which
unfortunately leaves refugees to live with a fragile, uncertain status, outside
the rule of law. A state might try to regularize the status of refugees by
creating an alternative third party sponsor, as Egypt did in the 1950s; or, by
taking a more aggressive
nationalist approach, the state might respond by
1 6
'
them.
expelling
simply
The idea that the UN functions as a sponsor of refugees raises intriguing
questions about refugee protection strategy. Consider, as an example, the
case of Lebanon in 2008. In an effort to mitigate prolonged detention of
refugees, UNHCR agreed to pay illegal entry fines for Iraqi refugees held in
detention, in exchange for their temporary release. 1 7 Lebanese authorities
released the refugees with only three-month visas, during which time they
again.
had to find an employer or risk becoming "illegal" in Lebanon
Such measures raised concerns about whether UNHCR might be
incentivizing detention by paying fines on behalf of refugees.
However, if UNHCR can secure temporary release by paying a fine
(reportedly $630 per refugee),' | 9 might UNHCR also be able to "buy" a
longer-term, more secure status for refugees? Employment sponsorship of a
foreigner involved a $300 fee, proof of a $1000 bank deposit, and provision
for medical tests and insurance.1 20 Such a strategy would appear crude
because it makes the responsibility shift explicit, based on a transparent
payment of money; but such an approach would not fundamentally alter the
de facto arrangements that currently exist. If sponsorship would make
UNHCR's role more easily digestible by local state systems, then perhaps it
is a strategy worthy of consideration.
The symbolic power of a third party working to normalize the status of
foreigners is a critical factor in the way the "grand compromise" continues
to take shape within diverse Arab states. If state interests were solely
resource-driven, UNHCR could induce a government to take responsibility
for critical functions by providing the necessary funds. For example,
throughout Africa and Latin America, UNHCR sometimes provides funding
for sovereign state governments to establish their own refugee status
determination apparati. In general, the symbolic importance of having a
116

For example, in 2000 Lebanese authorities launched a crackdown on UNHCR

recognized refugees. See Kagan, The Beleaguered Gatekeeper, supra note 34, at 5.
117 Yara Bayoumy, UNHCR hails Lebanon move to legaliseIraqi refugees, REUTERS, Feb.
21, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/2I/idUSL21812333.
118 Id.

..
9 Int'l Fed'n for Human Rights (FIDH), UNHCR-GSO Agreement Fails to Protect
Refugees in Lebanon (Mar. 21, 2008), available at www.fidh.org/UNHCR-GSO-Agreementfails-to-protect-refugees-in.
120 Id
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visible third party take responsibility for refugees is likely to lead
governments to prefer parallel structures, even if a more integrationist
approach would offer equal benefits in the opportunity to share material
resources.
VI. THE MOU: A SHADOW LEGAL REGIME?

While the Refugee Convention is not widely ratified and even less
commonly followed by Arab states, bilateral Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU) between UNHCR and host governments have emerged as alternative
legal instruments for regulating the status of refugees in several countries.
UNHCR has concluded MOUs with Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. 2 ' These
documents formalize the responsibility shift arrangement and come closer
than more conventional sources of international law to describing the
refugee system as it currently operates on the ground. They also occupy an
ambiguous place in international law for many of the reasons I explain
below.
While the Refugee Convention is ratified only by a few countries in the
region and is meant to be applicable to refugee situations worldwide, the
MOUs are negotiated directly with the individual state government and can
thus be tailored to an individual state's concerns, including by recognizing
fewer rights for refugees. Combined with the fact that it is not clear whether
an MOU creates binding obligations on a state the way a treaty would, it is
not surprising that MOUs are more attractive than the Convention for
governments in the Middle East region.
UNHCR's oldest office in the Middle East region is in Egypt, where the
agency reached an MOU with the government in 1954.122 Its terms were
quite general in relation to later MOUs, but were nevertheless fairly clear
about the division of labor between the state and the UN agency. UNHCR
would "help . . . the most destitute refugees'' 123 and would coordinate the
activities of "welfare societies" for the benefit of refugees.124 There was no
explicit reference to registration and refugee status determination, which
have in practice been central parts of UNHCR's operations in Egypt until the
present time. Rather, these roles were implied by the provision that UNHCR
would "cooperate with the governmental authorities in view of undertaking
121 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Jordan and UNHCR, Apr.

5,
1998, available at
http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE2JOR002 AREN.pdf
(hereinafter Jordan MOU].
122 Accord entre le Haut Comissariat des Nations Unies pour les Rifugi~s et le
Gouvernement
Egyptien,
Feb.
10,
1954,
http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE3EGY1054_844.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
123
124

Id. art. 2(d).
Id. art. 2(e).
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the census of and identifying the refugees eligible under the mandate of the
High [C]ommissioner."' 5 For its part, the Egyptian government agreed to
grant residence permits to "bona fide refugees ... who fall within the High
Commissioner's mandate. '' 126 Egypt promised no other rights to refugees,
and the agreement indicates that only repatriation or resettlement would be
considered viable or durable solutions. 127 UNHCR agreed to facilitate
voluntary repatriation 28 and to promote resettlement "in every possible
129
measure, to the countries of immigration, the refugees residing in Egypt."'
In practice, the arrangement described in the MOU continued long after
Egypt's ratification of the Refugee Convention in 1981.130
Whereas the original Egypt MOU was couched in general language,
later agreements between UNHCR and other Arab states have employed
more specific language. Jordan reached an agreement with UNHCR in
199731 establishing a basis for UJNHCR's office in the country, an MOU in
1998,132 as well as a temporary agreement in 2003 that was specific to Iraqi
refugees. 133 In Lebanon, UNHCR operated for several decades according to
an unwritten "Gentleman's Agreement", but this broke down in the late
1990s. 1 34 Following several years of systematic detention and deportations,
especially to Iraq and Sudan, UNHCR reached an MOU with the Lebanese
Government in 2003.135
The Jordan and Lebanon agreements contain several common features,
beginning with the explicit statements that these are transit countries only.

125 Id.art. 2(a).
126

Id. art. 6.

127 See generally id.

128 Id. art. 2(b).
129 Id. art. 2(c).
130 Kagan, The BeleagueredGatekeeper, supra note 34, at 4-5.
131 Agreement Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, July 30, 1997, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a124.htm.
132 Jordan MOU, supra note 121.
133 Letter of Understanding between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
and the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Apr. 15, 2003, 2222
U.N.T.S. 39512, available at http://www.carim.org/public/legaltexts/LE2JOR003_EN.pdf
[hereinafter Letter of Understanding].
134 See Kagan, The BeleagueredGatekeeper, supra note 34, at 5; Samira Trad & Michael
Kagan, Rights, Needs and Responsibility: Challenges to Rights-Based Advocacy for Refugees'
Health andEducation in Lebanon, in FORCED DISPLACEMENT: WHY RIGHTS MATTER 159, at

162-63 (Katarzyna Grabska & Lyla Mehta eds., 2008).
135 Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of the General Security
(Republic of Lebanon) and the Regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
Concerning the processing of cases of asylum-seekers applying for refugee status with the
UNHCR Office, Sept. 9, 2003 [hereinafter Lebanon MOU].
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The Jordan MOU describes the presence of refugees as a "sojourn," '1 36 while
the Lebanon agreement says in the preamble, "Lebanon is not an asylum
country,"' 137 a particularly noteworthy phrase to be found in a document
signed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. The Jordanian
agreement incorporated the 1951 Convention's definition of refugee
status,1 38 but the Lebanese version offered a more revealing alternative
definition: "The term 'asylum-seeker' shall mean . . . 'a person seeking
asylum in a country other than Lebanon." ' 139 Both agreements
assigned
40
responsibility for refugee status determination to UNHCR. 1
A common structural flaw in these agreements is that UNHCR lacks the
actual capacity to deliver on its substantive commitments. The Jordanian and
Lebanese MOUs give force to the transit country concept by imposing strict
time limits on refugees' residence: six months in the case of Jordan, and
twelve months in Lebanon.' 42 Because of the strict time limits, UNHCR
agreed with both counties to "endeavor"' 143 to seek a durable solution
elsewhere. The prescribed timelines create a significant protection gap since
UNHCR is not consistently able to resettle a refugee within one year of her
arrival.' 44 Even if the time limits were extended, UNHCR has no authority to
force resettlement countries to accept refugees.

136

Jordan MOU, supra note 121, art. 5.

7 Lebanon MOU, supra note 135, pmbl.
...Jordan MOU, supra note 121, art. 1.
"' Lebanon MOU, supra note 135, pmbl.
141 Jordan MOU, supra note 121, art. 2 (2), 3; Lebanon MOU, supra note 135, art. 8.
141 Jordan MOU, supra note 121, art. 5.
142 Lebanon MOU, supra note 135, arts. 5, 9. The MOU provides for an initial 3-month
visa for asylum-seekers, then 6 months for recognized refugees, extendable by another three
months.
143 Jordan MOU, supra note 121.
"' In 2010, UNHCR reported that on average it takes five months from the time it submits
a refugee case to a resettlement government until the refugee is able to travel. UNHCR,
Information Note and Recommendations - Emergency Resettlement and the Use of
Temporary Evacuation Transit Facilities, at 6 (July 6-8, 2010), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bf3adfb2.pdf. However, this five-month timetable is
only an average, and only counts the time after UNHCR submits a case to a government.
Before this UNHCR must complete registration and refugee status determination, and must
prepare the dossier for submission, a process that normally takes months and often takes years.
Based on my own experience as a legal aid practitioner in the Middle East, it is my observation
that the process has generally functioned as follows. After arrival, a refugee must first find the
UNHCR office and register. In some cases registration is immediate, but UNHCR offices
sometimes schedule appointments for registration several weeks in the future. The asylumseeker would then be scheduled for an intensive refugee status determination interview,
normally scheduled months in advance. After the interview there is another wait for a decision,
which can come within weeks but sometimes is delayed for months. If the person is rejected,
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There are other reasons to doubt the wisdom of UNHCR's consent to
the terms of these agreements. For example, UNHCR's MOU with Jordan
restricted the civil and political rights of refugees, and created a peculiar
connection between refugees' political activities and UNHCR's resettlement
criteria. Article 4 imposed on refugees and asylum-seekers a "duty" to not
embarrass the host government vis-A-vis its relations with other countries
and prohibits them from giving interviews to the media.' 45 In the case of a
violation of these provisions, UNHCR would endeavor to resettle recognized
refugees.146 One should question whether UNHCR has the legal authority to
trade refugees' civil and political rights in this manner.
Nevertheless, the MOUs contain some substantial advances for refugee
rights in countries which have not ratified the Refugee Convention; this
presumably explains some of UNHCR's willingness to agree in certain
cases. The Jordanian government agreed to abide by the principle of nonrefoulement, 147 and both the Jordanian and Lebanese agreements guaranteed
that UNHCR would be able to conduct refugee status determination (RSD)
with asylum-seekers who entered these countries illegally. 148 In Lebanon,
the government promised to notify UNHCR about the detention of asylumseekers,149 though there was no provision actually regulating when they
could be detained and
no ironclad guarantee that UNHCR would actually be
50
able to access them.'
In all these MOUs, responsibility for most social and economic
concerns was assigned to UNHCR, though the Jordanian government agreed
in vague terms to also play a role; in Jordan, 5UNHCR agreed to take
responsibility for assistance to "needy refugees."'' 1 For Iraqis in 2003, the
central government agreed to take "responsibility for admission and
immigration procedures, in accordance with the principle of nonrefoulement,'
and for the registration of refugees. 53
Somewhat
ambiguously, Jordan agreed to "support" healthcare for Iraqi refugees
through national institutions, 154 but UNHCR agreed to seek international aid

she would have the right to appeal. Appeal processing varies, but is typically treated as a lower
priority by UNHCR offices and can take several months or years.
"' Jordan MOU, supra note 121, art. 4.
146 Id.
147 Id. art. 2.
148 Id. art. 3.
149 Lebanon MOU, supra note 135, art.12.
15 Cf id. art. 13.
J' Jordan MOU, supra note 121, art. 11.
52 Letter of Understanding, supra note 133, art. 3(1.5).
...Jordan MOU, supra note 121, art. 3(1.6).
114 Id. art. 3(1.10).
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"to assist in the provision of' health, education, and other social services for
Iraqis. 155
This formulation left the precise division of labor between the
government and UN somewhat ambiguous, with the exception of food
assistance for which the World Food Programme (WFP) was assigned
primary responsibility.' 56 In Lebanon, by contrast, the division of labor
became more black and white: "UNHCR provides . . the necessary
assistance to refugees holding temporary circulation permits ... in order to
avoid that those refugees be forced to violate
the national laws or constitute
' 57
a burden on the Lebanese Government."'
The MOU has emerged as the primary legal codification of the UN
surrogate state, and embodies many of the pitfalls of state-to-UN
responsibility shift. While the Refugee Convention defines refugee status
and rights, the central focus of the MOUs is on setting out the division of
labor between host governments and UNHCR. Equally important, the MOU
reframes refugee protection as a bilateral contract between a state and an
international humanitarian agency. Refugees are not a party to the
arrangement, and have no means of enforcing it. So long as UNHCR is
willing to sign, a state can effectively use the MOU to codify the social and
economic marginalization of refugees. At the same time, LTNHCR is under
considerable pressure to agree even to a heavily compromised version of
refugee protection since otherwise there might be no legal mechanism at all
to address the refoulement of refugees.
VII.

THE CASE OF IRAQ

The willingness of Arab states to tolerate large numbers of refugees
while affording them only limited rights has been illustrated by their shared
response to the Iraqi refugee crisis since 2003. The Iraq response has been
highlighted as a testing ground for UNHCR's new approach to protecting
and assisting urban refugees,' 58 and has been thoroughly profiled
elsewhere. 59 In general, UNHCR' s experience has been regarded as a
relative success in that the space for protection has expanded beyond early
expectations,' 60 especially in view of the fact that the key host states are not
parties to the Refugee Convention and have thus far been opposed to the
local integration of refugees. 61 JNHCR was able to experiment with new
155 Id. art. 3(2).
156 Id. art. 3(2.1).

7 Lebanon MOU, supra note 135, art. 14.
58 See generally Crisp et al., supra note 71.

Id.; see also Barnes, supranote 15.
160 See Crisp, et al., supra 71, at 15-16,

19

161 Seeid. at16,

54.

56.
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means of directly delivering food and monetary assistance to needy Iraqi
refugees, 162 and carried out reception and registration. 63 Host governments
did open some services to refugees in the fields of education and health. 164
In most respects, the response to the Iraqi refugee crisis was to reinforce
the pre-existing UNHCR surrogate state. Much of the success has been
attributed to the high interest of donors and resettlement states in the Iraqi
refugee issue, allowing UNHCR to mobilize considerable resources for
responsibility sharing. 1 5 This is consistent with the "grand compromise" of
global refugee policy as discussed supra in Parts I and II. In fact, the Iraq
crisis might have been the best possible scenario for the grand compromise
to work. As a 2009 UNHCR study warned, "With donor support now likely
to decline, UNHCR will be confronted with some hard questions with regard
to the sustainability of the programme and the
need to prioritize some
166
activities while reducing or phasing out others."'
It is important to remember that the Iraq operation has been a relative
success. Iraqi refugees have not generally been granted the right to work and
thus subsist through informal economic means. 167 Their legal status and
68
security are not stable, and there have been reports of deportations.'
Although Arab host states could certainly have treated Iraqi refugees more
harshly, the lack of local integration leaves the refugees "very much in
limbo", 69 without a durable solution. Only general improvements on the
ground in Iraq offer some hope that this will not become a large scale,
protracted refugee situation similar to what Sudanese, Somali, and
Palestinian refugees have experienced in the Middle East Region.
The 2009 UNHCR report recommended that UNHCR continue to seek
incremental improvements in protection space, guided by a rights-based,
holistic, and community-oriented concept of refugee protection.
It also
suggested that UNHCR pursue a more robust strategy "to lead and
coordinate international action" for refugees, with particular attention to
sharing responsibility. 71 To develop such a strategy, UNHCR will need to
develop a coherent approach to the responsibility shift dilemma. If it is not
162

Id. at 36-37.

163

Id. at21-23.

64

For instance, with UNHCR financial contributions, Syria and Lebanon opened schools

to Iraqi children. Id. at 40, 1 183-84. Iraqi refugees also had access to health clinics on a basis
similar to nationals in Jordan and Lebanon. Id.at 39,
177-78.
165 Id. at 16, 9 57-59.
166 Id. at41,
190-191.
167 Id at 17, 65; see also Barnes, supranote 15, at 21.
168 Crisp, et al, supranote 71, at 17,
62, 66.
169 Id. at 17,9N65.
170 Id.at 19,
74-75.
171 Id.at 19, T 77-78.
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possible to ask host states to take on complete responsibility for refugee
protection, it is essential to define clearly those responsibilities that can be
shared with UNHCR.
VIII.

THE LIMITS OF THE SURROGATE STATE

A UNHCR surrogate state is not a complete substitute for an actual
state, because UNHCR ultimately can only exercise limited power to restrain
a government determined to harm refugees. A vivid example' 72 of this
power dynamic occurred just ten years ago in Lebanon, when UNHCR
conducted refugee status determination and the Lebanese authorities flatly
refused to give any significance to UNHCR's RSD decisions-ultimately
detaining and deporting hundreds of refugees and asylum-seekers.' 73 More
recently, Lebanon has presented a more complex scenario. On the one hand,
Lebanon's ministries of education and heath have opened schools and
hospitals to refugees, 74 a relatively rare example of a state extending
protection of positive liberties' 75 to refugees. Yet protection of negative
liberties' 76-protection from arrest and detention by the state-remains
deeply problematic. UNHCR recently reported that long-term detention
of
177
refugees, including children, are continuing concerns in Lebanon.
Another ominous warning about the limitations of responsibility shift
may be the recent changes in Egyptian practice toward refugees and asylumseekers. Over five decades, Egypt built a solid record observing the principle
of non-refoulement by respecting UNHCR's decisions in refugee status
determination, while also deferring to UNHCR responsibility for refugees'
social welfare.' 78 But in recent years, this arrangement in Egypt was
disrupted. In 2004, UNHCR suspended refugee status determination for

172

See also Marjolein Zieck, Inaugural Lecture at Amsterdam Law School: UNHCR's

Parallel Universe: Marking the Contours of a Problem (Apr. 23, 2010) (transcript available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1620929) (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
17' Kagan, The Beleaguered Gatekeeper, supra note 34, at 6.
171 Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report, Universal Periodic Review:
Republic
of
Lebanon
(Apr.
2010),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bcd705e2.html.
175 See supra text accompanying note 26.
176 See supra test accompanying note 25.
171 Policy on Refugee protection and Solutions in Urban Areas, supra note 6.
178 For example, the Department of State's annual human rights reports for Egypt in 2001,
2002, 2003 and 2004, all included the statement, "The Government generally cooperates with
the UNHCR and treated refugees in accordance with minimum standards and agreed
arrangements." U.S. DEPT. OF STATES, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:

EGYPT 2004 (2002-2005) (also included in the 2001 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

2003 editions), available at
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most Sudanese migrants in Egypt in favor of temporary protection 179 and
moved away from large-scale resettlement, "leaving many refugees
disappointed." ' 80 This led to immediate refugee protests in 2004, and the
reported arrests of twenty-two demonstrators.' 1 The following year, several
months of much larger mass demonstrations outside UNHCR's offices at
Mustafa Mahmoud Square in Cairo culminated in the deaths of twenty-seven
people (around half of them children) when Egyptian police used force to
break up the protest camp.182
In 2007, a new smuggling route from the Horn of Africa to Israel came
to prominence, with hundreds and then thousands of Eritreans, and then
other Africans entering Egypt illegally and intending to transit through the
Sinai border to Israel. This raised the political costs for the Mubarak-led
Egyptian Government to host refugees because the refugees now posed a
threat to Egypt's ability to control its borders and were suddenly a
complicating factor for Egypt's relationship with Israel, the country's most
sensitive foreign policy theater. In the summer of 2007, Egyptian forces
began to shoot and kill migrants on the Sinai border with Israel, leading to
the death of dozens over the ensuing two years.' 83 Egypt began to
systematically block UNHCR's access to asylum-seekers in detention,
especially if they had entered the country illegally, and in 2008 deported a
number of Eritreans en masse.184
The right to a livelihood' 85 raises a particular sticking point in countries
practicing responsibility shift. While other social and economic rights
"I See Hilal & Samy, supra note 67, at 35.
180

Karin Fathimath Afeef, A Promised Land for Refugees? Asylum and Migration in

Israel, in NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE
http://www.unhcr.org/4b2213a59.html.

RESEARCH

9

(Dec.

2009),

available at

181 FATEH AZZAM, A TRAGEDY OF FAILURES AND FALSE EXPECTATIONS: REPORT ON THE
EVENTS SURROUNDING THE THREE-MONTH SIT-IN AND FORCED REMOVAL OF SUDANESE

REFUGEES INCAIRO, SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 2005, at II (American University in Cairo ed.,
June 2006).
182 For an accounting of theses events, see id.
183 See generally, HUMAN

RIGHTS

WATCH,

SINAI PERILS:

RISKS

TO MIGRANTS,

REFUGEES, AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL (2008).
184 See id.
185 See

generally JAMES

C.

HATHAWAY,

THE

RIGHTS

OF

REFUGEES

UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW 740 (2005) (describing the limited applicability of general human rights
law to non-citizens with regard to economic rights). In international law, a refugee's right to
seek employment depends on the applicability of the Refugee Convention's articles 17 and 18.
In the region described in this article, only Egypt has ratified the Convention. However, there
has been confusion about whether these articles are binding on Egypt, since Egypt entered a
reservation to article 24, relating to labor legislation. Some sources suggest that this
reservation excludes refugees in Egypt from right to work protections in the Refugee
Convention. See, e.g., Elizabeth Umlas, Cash in hand: Urban refugees, the right to work and
UNHCR's advocacy activities, 15, UNHCR PDES/2011/05 (May 2011). This is not correct.
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(healthcare, education, etc.) are typical positive liberties 186 calling for
services to be provided to refugees, the right to earn an income is actually a
negative one-the right to engage in wage-eaming employment or
entrepreneurship without state interference. 87 The UN Development
Programme (UNDP) has said, "Beyond continuing insecurity, trying to earn
a decent income is the single greatest challenge that displaced people
encounter, especially where they lack identity papers.' ' 188 A recent UNHCR
publication reported that of the 214 countries surveyed, only 37 percent fully
met international standards in protecting refugees' right to work, and 32
percent of countries do not even partially meet international law
standards. 189
Merely issuing identity papers and residence permits to refugeeswhich is routinely done in several states throughout the Middle East
Region-does not, on its own, open legal avenues of employment. In Egypt,
refugees' residence permits do not bear the critical phrase, "Work is
permitted," that is used on other foreigners' work permits. A survey of 252
refugees in Egypt in 2003 found that 56 percent "stated that the main
problem they encounter when looking for a job is the impossibility for them
to obtain a work permit."' 190 More than double that number cites lack1of
job
91
skills, cultural or language obstacles, or even general shortage ofjobs.
Restrictions on refugees' right to work impose far greater burdens on
nutrition and cash assistance programs to alleviate extreme poverty, and also
add pressure to resettle more refugees for lack of local integration prospects.
But this is precisely why restricting refugees' right to work makes sense for
host governments. If refugees are able to support themselves, it will appear
that they are on the road to integration, a policy opposed by host
governments which seek to share costs with the international community in
hosting refugees. While it seems logical that scarce resources should be
targeted and reserved for those individuals who are the most vulnerable, host
governments that want to attract the same resources have, in many ways, a

Egypt entered no reservations to article 17 and article 18, and is bound to recognize refugees'
right to work to the full extent of the Refugee Convention.
186 See supra text accompanying note 25.
187 Id.
"8
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009:
OVERCOMING BARRIERS: HUMAN MOBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT 63, available at

http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009 EN-Complete.pdf.
189

UNHCR,

DESIGNING APPROPRIATE INTERVENTIONS IN URBAN SETTINGS: HEALTH,

EDUCATION, LIVELIHOODS, AND REGISTRATION FOR URBAN REFUGEES AND RETURNEES 18

(2009), availableat http://www.unhcr.org/4b2789779.pdf.
190 UNHCR REGIONAL OFFICE (CAIRO), REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE IN CAIRO: OISTACLES
AND PROSPECTS 50 (2003).
191

Id.
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perverse incentive to make the refugees on their territory as vulnerable as
possible.
In a region where states have limited commitment to refugees, priority
must be placed on sovereign state willingness to recognize the refugees'
right to basic security.192 UNHCR could, resources permitting, substitute in
many ways for many of the functions of sovereign state education and health
ministries. However, it cannot free refugee children from detention if
domestic state security agencies, prosecutors, and courts refuse to do so. It is
therefore essential that states and the UNHCR, in joint MOU agreements
and elsewhere, make explicit and clear the responsibilities that UNHCR can
and cannot take on.

IX.

AMENDING THE PARADIGM: SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

The UNHCR study of the agency's response to the Iraqi refugee crisis
contains a succinct expression of the basic strategic dilemma which UNHCR
faces in Arab states in the Middle East Region. In the words of a senior
UNHCR staff member, "'We were right when we decided against any
attempt to impose the full refugee regime on the Iraqi refugee situation, but
we have gone as far as possible with the 'tolerance regime."'' 193 The
prevailing answer to this dilemma, today, is to refocus international
resources on host state responsibility. In its new policy on urban refugee
protection, UJNHCR has sought to simultaneously lower expectations about
what UNHCR can accomplish on its own194 while reemphasizing the role of
host governments. 195 In addition to resisting the creation of parallel social
welfare systems for refugees, UNHCR "ideally" seeks to supplement state
services to refugees
only for a "limited time" until they can be included in
196
national systems.
The problem with this approach is that it does little more than state an
objective. The purpose of this Article is not to dispute the objective of states
taking responsibility for hosting and ultimately providing genuine asylum to
refugees. But merely stating the ideal does not make it a reality. Given the
192For refugees, the core of security is the principle of non-refoulement, which in the
Refugee Convention is one of the rights to which no state may enter a reservation. Refugee
Convention, supra note 58, art. 42. It is also a principle of customary international law. See
Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of Non-Refoulement: Opinion,
in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk & Frances
Nicholson eds., 2003). In practical terms, social and economic rights are difficult to realize
without secure legal status and physical protection. See Trad & Kagan, supra note 134.
193 UNHCR REGIONAL OFFICE (CAIRO), REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE IN CAIRO: OBSTACLES

AND PROSPECTS 18 (2003). For a similar commentary, see Hilal & Samy, supra note 67, at 70.
194 Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas, supra note 6, at 3 12.
Id. at 6,
116Id. at 6,
19

27.
29. For a stronger articulation of this ideal, see De Lorenzo, supra note 61.
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structural political incentives for states that lead to responsibility shift to
begin with, it is difficult to conceive of how it can be reversed absent some
substantial strategic shift. In the Middle East Region, one would have to find
a way to persuade governments to turn away from the longstanding
ideological opposition to the integration of outsiders, a task made more
difficult by powerful ideological opposition to the integration of
Palestinians. Certainly any viable strategy would have to involve the
cooperation of donor states, but the international pressure would need to be
considerable. At minimum, donors would need to insist on including
refugees in development programs as a condition for receiving development
aid at all so that host governments would not perceive a gain for their own
citizens in marginalizing refugees.
There is reason for skepticism about whether donor states would
prioritize refugee welfare enough to place this kind of pressure on host
governments' 97 and reason for worry that even if donors followed this path,
host governments might still resist for ideological or political reasons. Donor
states would also have to overcome resentment that they generally take on
smaller refugee hosting burdens than many Arab states. As we have seen in
Lebanon, even when donor assistance opens doors to state-provided health
and education, refugees can still be in grave danger of detention and
refoulement. The risks are clear: refugees, when placed in a Hobson's choice
situation for sovereign states that have relied for some time on UNHCR to
handle most services, might be abandoned entirely.
The primary analytical tools of refugee law are state-centric, making it
difficult to perceive state-to-UN responsibility shift as anything but an
anomaly. Formal international law often highlights a stalemate between the
principled recognition of rights and norms and strong state sovereignty; the
traditional paradigm thus makes these norms difficult to impose or enforce
directly. 198 Despite this paradox, there is more adaptability built into the
international system than meets the eye. There is already sufficient
flexibility built into UNHCR's mandate to allow for a departure from the
premise that states alone must deliver refugee protection in all
circumstances.' 99 As UNHCR's Director of International Protection Services

'9' Katarzyna Grabska, Who Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies, and Wellbeing of
Refugees in Egypt, FORCED MIGRATION & REFUGEE STUDIES, at 87 (2006),
http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/research reports/Kasia EgyptResearchReportEDl
TED.pdf.
198 See Richard Bilder, Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate, in COMMITMENT
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

SYSTEM 65 (Dina Shelton ed., 2000) (arguing that international law usually cannot be imposed
on states and that the goal should be "helping nations cooperate rather than simply making
them behave").
199 Turk, supra note 3, at 3-4, 8.
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said, UNHCR's mandate is built upon a "clear international consensus that
states cannot manage or resolve forced displacement or statelessness
problems unilaterally and in isolation from each other." 200 He noted that
UNHCR's frontline protection work "is a unique feature in international
law: an international institution interceding
directly on behalf of distinct
20 1
individuals and groups of people."
My goal here is to point toward a more pragmatic strategy without
compromising on the rights that refugees should enjoy; a practical approach
should be based on the philosophy that legal form should follow the
protection function. Assignment of the responsibility for protecting rights
should be allocated to the institution best positioned to carry out the duty. As
a default rule, the state should usually be responsible because in the
international arena, states are presumed to have the clearest ability and
authority to act. But there are situations where either state capacity is
lacking, or political constraints disincentivize state governments from using
it. In these situations, the United Nations may best be able to promote the
protection of refugees by taking on some of the responsibility for refugee
protection.
As Sir Brian Urquhart has written, "What is needed now is not to
abolish national sovereignty but to reconcile it with the demands of human
survival and decency in the astonishingly dangerous world we have
absentmindedly created. 20 2 This adaptation is possible because while
governments remain stubbornly committed to narrow national interests as
the primary basis for state action,2 03 sovereignty has proven to be a dynamic
concept that can evolve as national interests demand.20 4 States are able to
find advantage in shifting functions to international agencies without
compromising on their ultimate independence. Responsibility shift is just
one means of enhancing global cooperation.
When parallel UN structures are the most effective means to achieve
functional rights for refugees, UNHCR need not apologize for them. There
are some things that only states can do, but there are nevertheless some
critical components of refu ee protection that UNHCR often performs better
than many governments.
Rather than continue to insist on pure state
200 Id. at 3.
201 Id.
202 Brian Urquhart, Findingthe Hidden UN, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 27,
2010,
at
26,
28,
available
at
http://al.odu.edu/mun/docs/ArticleNYbookreview 27 May_2010.pdf (last visited July 19,
2010).
203 Weiss, supra note 42, at 21.
204 id
205 RSDWATCH.ORG, Statistics show UNHCR more likely to protect asylum-seekers than
most governments

(July

24,

2008),

available
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responsibility as a policy for all situations, it might be better to build on the
positive/negative liberties distinction that is evident in most responsibility
shift situations. Wherever direct resources or active implementation are
required, the UN can take primary responsibility by operating health
programs, paying for schools, or carrying out refugee status determination.
Negative liberties, which depend on restraining state action, would be a state
responsibility for the simple reason that these areas of protection cannot be
transferred.
The goal should be to identify the bare minimum which must be asked
of states in order to functionally realize refugees' security, social, and
economic rights, and to develop incentives for states to perform these
roles-and only these roles. The UN could take responsibility for all other
areas of refugee protection. To build a viable foundation for refugee
protection, responsibility shift would need to be de jure, not simply de facto.
The division of labor between states and the UN would need to be explicit,
and the UN would need to address its own internal accountability gaps so
that it can administer services consistent with standard due process norms.
This might be accomplished by pushing for stronger MOUs with host
governments in which UNHCR more directly agrees to take on certain
responsibilities for refugees in exchange for firmer commitments from state
governments.
Table 1: Dividing Roles between UNHCR and States

Health services

Non-refoulement

Education*

Freedom from arbitrary detention

Monetary and nutritional assistance

Protecting the right to work

Other social services

Police functions
security

and

physical

http://rsdwatch.wordpress.com/2008/07/24/statistics-show-unhcr-more-likely-to-protectasylum-seekers-than-most-govemments/; see also RSDWATCH.ORG, UNHCR 's recognition
rate: Relatively high overall, but inconsistent up close (July 15, 2009), available at
http://rsdwatch.wordpress.com/2009/07/15/unhcrs-recognition-rate-relatively-high-overall-butinconsistent-up-close/.

HeinOnline -- 18 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 339 2011-2012

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 18:2

Refugee status determination and
registration**
* It is preferable for refugee children to be integrated with nonrefugees in schools, which could be accomplished by UNHCR paying school
fees. However, if this inclusive approach is blocked, it is preferable for
refugee children to attend separateschools ratherthan none at all.
** UNHCR can perform these roles if the state agrees to recognize
UNHCR's decisions in order to protect refugees from refoulement and
arbitrarydetention.
In many respects, what is outlined here is what UNHCR already does
on the ground. In a sense, what I advocate is less a change in practice than a
change in norms, based on the premise that for refugees, real functional
access to the normative rights established by law is much more important
than the division of labor between sovereign states and the United Nations.
Excessive focus on state responsibility puts UNHCR on the defensive in
seeking donor support for parallel structures when the stated policy calls for
building up host government capacities. But in the end, it matters much
more whether a refugee has access to a doctor than whether a host
government or the United Nations employs that doctor.
Even if it is less than ideal, state-to-UN responsibility shift has in many
ways seen some functional examples of global governance. The UN
surrogate state has increased international cooperation and navigated
political minefields to produce a much more humane outcome for refugees
than might otherwise have occurred in many countries.
X. CONCLUSION

State-to-UN responsibility shift exists because it addresses political
interests of states, both in terms of material benefits and symbolic benefits. It
serves material resource interests in helping states in the global south deflect
the material burdens of hosting refugees onto northern donor states without
any formalized system by which to achieve meaningful international burden
sharing. On a symbolic level, responsibility shift helps states, which could
not politically accept full integration of refugees to nevertheless tolerate
their long-term presence. It also can help reduce the political costs for a host
state in that the host government is freed from making key decisions about a

HeinOnline -- 18 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 340 2011-2012

2012]

The UN "SurrogateState "

refugee population that may be a source of political sensitivity with a
neighboring state.
These state interests are reflections of the imperfect world in which we
live, and they must be taken seriously. As the confluence of popular
democratic movements throughout the region, popularly known as the "Arab
Spring," 20 6 change the dynamics of governance in Arab countries, there is
likely to be increased capacity to seek improvements in how refugees
throughout the region are treated and received. Should a more democratic
system of government take hold, it will be essential for those who want to
build a stronger system of refugee protection to carefully consider how best
to take advantage of any window of opportunity that results. Increased
openness in government, strengthened civil society, a more responsive and
independent judiciary, and renewed faith in rule of law all can work in favor
of refugee rights.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for caution as well. It may be difficult to
convince a newly elected government to take on substantial new burdens for
refugees at a time when its citizens are expecting rapid progress on a range
of economic, social, and political fronts. Also, elected governments can be
impacted by popular resentments of immigrants. Inspirational ideas of
national unity can give birth to uglier forms of nationalism and xenophobia.
A conventional approach to reforming refugee protection would be to
press for treaty ratification and legislation that embrace refugee rights to
create a genuine system of asylum in the Arab world. This should remain,
without question, the ultimate goal. But advocates for refugees should be
conscious of the political demands that this places on fragile governments
and should consider whether it is the only way to achieve better protection of
refugee rights. There may be substantial risks in trying for this maximalist
approach and failing, and in the process missing a rare opportunity. My
argument is that it might be more fruitful to consider building upon what
already exists in skeletal form, to legitimize the UNHCR surrogate state as
an effective strategy to promote protection, to seek out more effective means
to channel the underlying state interests into the wider protection of refugee

206 Somewhat ironically, the phrase "Arab Spring" was first used by proponents of the
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to describe the political changes that they believed would follow
from the toppling of Sadam Hussein. See Gale, Arab Spring, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CONTEXT
=
(June 10, 2012), http://find.galegroup.com/gic/infomark.do?&source=galc&idigest
87c3696ed657d25964dd4ad8a05241 ea&prodld=GIC&userGroupName=rich43584&tabID=&
docld=CP3208520388&type=retrieve&contentSet=GR.EF&version=1.0. The term re-emerged
in early 2011 as the wave of protests against authoritarian Arab governments spread from
Tunisia to Egypt. See Joshua Keating, Who first used the term Arab Spring?, FOREIGN POLICY
(Nov. 4, 2011, 3:17 PM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/201I/11/04/who first_
used the term arab spring.
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rights, and to be clearer about the responsibilities that can and cannot be
assigned to UNHCR.2 ° 7
The UN surrogate state can be a good thing, and in some cases it should
be strengthened. When it is the path of least resistance to realizing refugee
rights, responsibility shift should be considered a legitimate protection
strategy. However, in so doing, the division of labor between states and
UNTCR must be assigned appropriately. UNHCR's actual responsibilities
must be clearly defined and delimited so that there is no implication that
UNHCR can remedy all problems on its own. For those things that UNHCR
can control, it should become more accountable to the refugees, the host
state, the international community and standard due process safeguards
which should apply for refugees seeking protection with the UNHCR. But
for matters beyond its capacities, there should be clarity that responsibility
lies with the state.
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For a detailed proposal of how this approach might be applied, see Michael Kagan,

Shared responsibility in a new Egypt: A strategy for refugee protection, AM. U. IN CAIRO
CENTER
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(2011),

htp://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/reports/Pages/In-depthanalyses.aspx.
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